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SERIES NOTE
The Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) was
established in March 1990 under an agreement between the Australian
National University and the Commonwealth of Australia (Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission). CAEPR operates as an independent
research unit within the University's Faculty of Arts. CAEPR's principle
objectives are to undertake research to:
• investigate the stimulation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
economic development and issues relating to Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander employment and unemployment;
• identify and analyse the factors affecting Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander participation in the labour force; and
• assist in the development of government strategies aimed at raising
the level of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander participation in the
labour market.
The Director of the Centre is responsible to the Vice-Chancellor of the
Australian National University and receives assistance in formulating the
Centre's research agenda from an Advisory Committee consisting of five
senior academics nominated by the Vice-Chancellor and four
representatives nominated by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission, the Department of Employment, Education and Training
and the Department of Social Security.
CAEPR DISCUSSION PAPERS are intended as a forum for the
dissemination of refereed papers on research that falls within the CAEPR
ambit. These papers are produced for discussion and comment within the
research community and Aboriginal affairs policy arena. Many are
subsequently published in academic journals. Copies of discussion papers
can be purchased from Reply Paid 440, ANUTECH Pty Ltd, Canberra,
ACT, 0200 (phone: 06 249 2479; FAX 06 257 5088).
As with all CAEPR publications, the views expressed
in this DISCUSSION PAPER are those of the author(s)





This paper is the first of two focusing on resource allocation policy and
practice in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
(ATSIC). The current approach to the distribution of funds is examined
here, while CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 42 examines the potential
relevance and implications of fiscal equalisation for ATSIC's future
funding policy and practice.
A review of ATSIC's current financial structure and powers forms the
context for a wider consideration of the financial relationships evolving
between the organisation's structural elements. In the complex budgetary
process, ATSIC's existing functionally-based program structure is linked
to legally specified funding roles. The budgetary procedures and related
program framework are critically examined. The role of regional
councils and regional planning are discussed and the implications of
financial tensions emerging between councils are raised. The emerging
relationship between ATSIC's Board of Commissioners, administrative
arm and regional councils is posed as crucial, as is that between the
newly-formed State Advisory Committees and councils.
The paper considers the implications for ATSIC's current funding role of
its representative regional structure, its program structure and emerging
pressures towards decentralisation, arguing that ATSIC is in need of an
integrated, holistic funding policy and procedures which link regional
planning and service needs to national decisions about resource
distribution.
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The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) is a
complex and unique structure within contemporary Aboriginal affairs. Its
present financial role, however, continues to be influenced by the legacy
of its predecessors, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) and the
Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC).1 The financial operations
of DAA were often criticised as being ad hoc, driven by a crisis mentality
generated by high levels of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
economic disadvantage, and subject to the vagaries of changing
relationships with governments, Ministers and influential Aboriginal
organisations.2 The funding role of the ADC was similarly criticised and
regarded as being inflexible in its strict economic approach to Aboriginal
social and cultural needs. ATSIC's new legal functions and structure
provide it with an opportunity to reassess current funding policy and
practice. There are indications of a changing approach. ATSIC is
currently evaluating the effectiveness of its program and administrative
structure and is attempting to develop budget procedures that reflect its
distinctive regional basis.3
Future funding directions taken by ATSIC will continue to be influenced
by broader public policy issues of program evaluation, allocative
efficiency and increasing parliamentary pressure for greater financial
accountability. But funding policy and procedures are also increasingly
being influenced by the distinctive regional structure and the concerns
voiced by Aboriginal organisations and communities for greater
transparency in its funding process. The considerable challenge before
ATSIC, in the face of such critical attention, is to establish an approach to
funding which not only results in the equitable allocation of resources and
ensures that its funds result in perceivable advances in Aboriginal
socioeconomic status (Dillon 1992), but which also promotes its stated
objective of 'putting power back into the hands of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples' (O'Donoghue 1992: 5).
This paper is the first of two focusing on funding distribution policy and
practice within ATSIC. The central concern in both papers is the evident
need for a more coherent, transparent funding process that would result
in a 'fair distribution of economic resources' (Commonwealth of
Australia 1992: 21). ATSIC's current approach to funding distribution is
examined here and the potential relevance and implications of fiscal
equalisation for its future funding policy and practice is discussed in a
subsequent paper (Smith 1993).
A review of ATSIC's current financial structure and powers forms the
context for a wider consideration of the nature of the financial
relationships evolving between the organisation's structural elements. In
the complex budgetary process, ATSIC's existing functionally-based
program structure is linked to legally specified funding roles. These
budgetary procedures and related program framework are critically
examined. The role of regional councils and regional planning are
considered and the implications of financial tensions emerging between
councils are raised. The emerging relationship between ATSIC's Board of
Commissioners (hereafter referred to as the board), administrative arm
and regional councils is posed as a crucial one; as is that between the
newly-formed State Advisory Committees (SACs) and councils. The
paper considers the implications for ATSIC's funding role of its
representative regional structure, its current program operations and
emerging pressures towards decentralisation, arguing that it is in need of
an integrated, holistic funding policy, and procedures which link regional
planning and service needs to national decisions about funding
distribution.
ATSIC's financial structure and powers
ATSIC's financial role is guided by the objectives of its enabling
legislation, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act
1989. These emphasise the need to ensure the maximum participation of
indigenous people in the formulation and implementation of government
policies affecting them; to promote the development of self-determination
and self-sufficiency; further their economic, social and cultural
development; and ensure co-ordination of policies which affect them at all
levels of government (section 3).
The Act also sets out the bases upon which particular financial activities
can be undertaken, including making grants for property (sections 14 and
15); housing loans and grants (section 16); enterprise loans and grants
(section 17); and funding for a range of purposes to indigenous
corporations and to State and Territory governments (section 18). Section
18 effectively encompasses all ATSIC programs while the other sections
relate essentially to the operation of the now superseded ADC. ATSIC is
authorised, in all of these financial areas, to establish the terms and
conditions under which it makes funds available and, importantly, to
'develop policy proposals to meet national, State, Territory and regional
needs and priorities of Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders'
(sub-section 7(c)).
ATSIC is somewhat unique in government administration. Its financial
powers and structure extend across a hierarchy of elected representatives
on the one hand, and an equally hierarchical administrative arm on the
other. Sixty regional councils were elected in November 1990, each with
between 10-20 councillors acting as regional representatives for three
years.4 Each regional council is a separate legal entity with a range of
financial and other functions set out in sections 94-9 of the Act. These
include the formulation and revision of regional plans for improving the
economic, social and cultural status of the indigenous population; assisting
and advising ATSIC and other Commonwealth and State government
bodies in the implementation of that plan; and via the budgetary process,
making proposals for expenditure in the region. Councils do not receive
or spend funds, rather they will propose intra-regional allocations on the
basis of their regional plans.
Regional councils are grouped into 17 zones. Councillors for each zone
elect a commissioner to represent them on ATSIC's Board of
Commissioners. The board also has a chairperson and two other
commissioners appointed by the federal Minister for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs. The board of 20 commissioners is legally
required to determine financial priorities and develop budget estimates
and a draft budget (section 7). The board and regional councillors have
executive responsibility for developing and monitoring ATSIC policy and
programs at the national and regional level respectively, and the board
for advising the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Affairs (ATSIC 1990, 1992a, 1993a).5
The administrative arm is divided into three tiers at the central, state and
regional office level. At the apex, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
appointed by the Minister subject to agreement by the board, has statutory
responsibility for the daily administration of the organisation. The CEO
is directly responsible to the Minister in the exercise of these duties, not
to the Aboriginal board or to regional councils. At the base of the
administrative arm are 29 regional offices responsible for the delivery of
ATSIC programs and often serving the needs of more than one regional
council. Regional offices administer funds allocated by the councils to
Aboriginal organisations and communities, as well as funds allocated by
SACs and the board. Regional offices are supported by state offices which
co-ordinate grant administration and budget preparation, monitor
programs and liaise with State governments in relation to the provision of
state and local services to Aboriginal people (ATSIC 1993a: 11).
In 1991, SACs were set up in each State (under section 13 of the Act)
comprising all state regional council chairpersons, state managers and
commissioners to facilitate financial planning and decision making
between regional councils, the bureaucracy and the board. While ATSIC
(1993a: 13) argues that these state committees are not to replace the
formal consultation between the board and councils, their terms of
reference are, nevertheless, extremely wide. In each State, it is the SAC
which effectively recommends to the board the division of available state
funds between constituent regional councils; advises the board on
programs to be conducted on a national basis; and on expenditure trends
with respect to programs and regional council administration (ATSIC
1992a: 28).
The effectiveness of ATSIC funding policy and decision-making hinges on
the successful interaction between its board and regional councils and, in
turn, on their relations with the Commission bureaucracy and other levels
of government (Dillon 1992). It is primarily in the budget process that
the financial relationship between these organisational elements is
established.
ATSIC's budgetary process
The following account of ATSIC's budgetary procedures offers a partial
and simplified view of a complex process. The Act requires ATSIC's
board to prepare budgetary estimates for each forthcoming financial year
outlining expenditure under sections 14-18 and requires regional councils
to prepare draft budgets setting out proposed allocations within their
areas. The manner by which these estimates are arrived at involves
considerable negotiation between the board, regional councils, state and
regional offices, and SACs (ATSIC 1992a).
On bureaucratic advice, the board initially determines the broad mix of
funds to its own estimate items; to items excluded from regional council
budgets; to regional programs; and for state grants (ATSIC 1992a: 25).
ATSIC may issue papers to SACs and state managers on possible new
budget and policy proposals, and provides details of existing and forward
commitments, state grants and multi-regional projects. State Advisory
Committees are supposed to formulate recommendations on the
distribution of state allocations between regional councils. Regional
offices within each State also provide information on regional councils'
ongoing commitments and priorities for new project funding. Taking
these areas of advice into account, the board and central financial
administrators determine a draft budget and regional budgetary
statements, or offers are made to each council.
The draft budget statement for each regional council takes into account
the amount spent in the previous year, plus an increment for inflation. To
this extent, regions have initially been locked into the historical funding
precedents set by DAA. Regional councils, with assistance from regional
offices, prepare and return plans for distributing funds within their own
region covering proposed, ongoing and new projects. These intra-
regional allocations are expected to be made on the bases of regional plans
initially due for completion in March 1993. At this stage guidelines may
be given by the board to councillors concerning matters it wants them to
'consider' in preparing their final budgets (under sub-section 63(12)). On
the bases of 60 regional council budget plans and an accumulation of
administrative advice, final estimates for the forthcoming financial year
are prepared and submitted to the Minister for final approval (sections
61-5).
Many aspects of this budgetary process remain untested and hypothetical.
For example, not all councils have prepared regional plans or have used
them to prioritise and plan their budgets. Nor is it clear to what extent
ATSIC's board and SACs formulate recommendations for distributing
funds between councils and whether these are based on regional plans and
priorities.
The program basis of the budget
Within this complicated process of budgetary feedback, funding and
financial accountability are essentially program-driven. ATSIC's own
program structure is based on three major functional divisions: economic,
social and corporate. These three areas are divided into a functionally-
based set of 19 sub-programs, which have approximately 67 components,
112 sub-components and further subdivisions within these. Every
program area has specific objectives, funding procedures and criteria.
Each cost centre within the financial structure (cost centres such as six
state and 29 regional offices, and 60 regional councils) has the potential to
receive funds into these different program ledger accounts. Added to this
monolithic program structure, the Act has imposed two major program
funding categories: regional programs operating under regional council
discretion and administered by regional offices, and national programs
administered by the ATSIC Board of Commissioners and central office.
However, it is ATSIC, not the Act, which specifies the relative division of
funds to be allocated between these two broad program categories (Dillon
1992: 94).
The Act further specifies (under sub-section 97(5)) that a number of
national funding areas referred to as 'Commission items' are excluded
from regional council discretion. These include the Community
Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme, state grants,
ATSIC's administrative expenses, loan guarantees, housing loans and
funds for the Commercial Development Corporation and portfolio
organisations. In 1992-93, these statutory exclusions amounted to $509.7
million, representing 59 per cent of ATSIC's budget of $862 million
(ATSIC 1992a: 14-15, 19).6 After allocations are made to these areas, the
remaining budget is potentially at the discretion of regional councils.
However, ATSIC has also excluded from the regional program budget a
series of programs that are said to be more 'appropriately conducted on a
national basis' (ATSIC 1992a: 17).? Thus, it was decided that as well as
statutory-based exclusions, regional council program budgets for 1991-92
should exclude projects for which there were grant difficulties due to
council boundary anomalies; funding for significant capital projects; and
the balance of available funds (Taree Regional Council 1991: 9). In 1992-
93, these national program exclusions totalled $197.2 million,
representing 22.8 per cent of the total budget. In total, statutory and
ATSIC-initiated exclusions comprised $706.9 million in 1992-93,
representing 82 per cent of the total program budget. It is not clear how
allocations for multi-regional projects will be determined relative to those
for all other individual regions, nor on what basis funds for other
national program and Commission items will be distributed between
councils.
Once the board determines the funds to be allocated to Commission items
listed in sub-section 97(5), and to any areas approved by the Minister for
exclusion from regional council budgets, the amount remaining is
available for allocation by councils. In 1992-93, regional councils will be
responsible for allocating 18 per cent ($155.3 million) of the total funds
available to ATSIC. ATSIC has stated that it is aiming for a 'gradual
transition to fully-fledged regional council allocations, involving a
reduction in the number and amount of exclusions from regional council
draft budgets over a period of time'. If the ATSIC-initiated exclusions
and the discretionary budget were fully transferred to the regional
program budget category, councils could potentially have been
responsible for approximately 41 per cent of the total budget in 1992-93.
However, to incorporate statutory exclusions would require legislative
change (ATSIC 1992a: 8-10, 14, 27).
Allocations to regional council are directed according to a functionally-
based program structure and council financial powers are circumscribed
by budget procedures and board guidelines. Councils are required to first
provide for any forward commitments when proposing budgetary
allocations (ATSIC 1992a: 33). ATSIC's ability to establish guidelines for
regional council budgetary decisions has already been evident. During the
1990-91 financial year, it notified councils that all new project bids be
channelled into the Community Housing and Infrastructure Program
(CHIP) funding area (Sydney Regional Council 1991: 47). Board
guidelines for 1992-93 have been given to councils to maintain available
capital funds intact. Hence, when councils wish to establish new projects
requiring ongoing recurrent funding, they have been advised to do so by
'savings', or 'from new or additional funds' (ATSIC 1992a: 29). The
extent to which councils will be able to save, or indeed obtain additional
funds remains to be seen. No doubt, some will be more successful in this
than others and for reasons as much dependent on different regional
socioeconomic status and political astuteness, as on financial management.
Councils can make variations of up to 10 per cent in the amounts allocated
to particular items within their approved estimates (sub-section 61.5), but
are not able to increase total spending outside of their approved budget
and cannot transfer allocations across programs. It is debatable whether
regional council budgets will continue to reflect the same program
categories or priorities as those established by the board and the
bureaucracy. Also, given the growing financial demands placed upon
limited regional council budgets, the sheer weight of socioeconomic need
identified in regional plans, and the degree to which many indigenous
communities find themselves using funds to substitute for state funding in
essential service areas, ATSIC faces the risk that many councils will be
faced with the overwhelming need to re-direct resources to recurrent
expenditure.
ATSIC acknowledges that the most difficult area for decision is how to
allocate available funds between regions (ATSIC 1992a: 27, 28). To date,
however, in all of these complex legislative and budgetary procedures for
distributing program funds, no formal mechanism has been established by
which the mix of funds between regional and national program areas is
decided, and importantly, by which funds are divided between regional
councils. This represents an ongoing problem in ATSIC's strategies for
achieving its social, economic and legal objectives. While the board,
management and SACs rely on budgetary advice and objectives presented
by regional councils, there is no mechanism in place by which this
information is assessed in relation to the needs of all councils. The result
is that in some cases, regional council budgets have been determined by
SAC decisions to simply divide state allocations equally between all
councils within each State, regardless of council population size, area,
location or any other socioeconomic factor. The end-product is that some
councils will be financially disadvantaged over others with respect to the
level of funding received.8 Whilst SACs have been told to avoid 'simply
handing out funds evenly among Councils' and to base their distributive
decisions on 'an assessment of needs and priorities of different Regions'
('Regional council matters', The Regional Councillor, January 1993),
there are currently no established procedures for doing so. Nor is it
certain that such an assessment of relative funding needs should be the
responsibility of different SACs, as opposed to being assessed at the
national level by the board to ensure an equitable distribution of funds.
Clearly, ATSIC needs to develop a national policy framework and formal
mechanisms to enable a uniformly assessed and equitable distribution of
funds between States and importantly, between regions.
The role of regional plans in the budgetary process
Under sub-section 94(1)(a) of the Act, regional councils are required to
establish a 'plan for improving the economic, social and cultural status' of
Aboriginal residents in each region. In these plans councils are expected
to identify local needs, aspirations and priorities, and propose
development strategies for achieving improvements. There are many
expectations attached to these plans. They are posed as being 'a significant
step in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders achieving self-
determination and self-management1 (ATSIC 1992b: 6, 1992a: 29,
1992c).
It is envisaged that regional plans will provide a 'fundamental tool' and 'a
strategic basis for the allocation of ATSIC budgets' (ATSIC 1992a: 29).
At the level of regional council jurisdiction, the plans are expected to
establish the priorities for distributing ATSIC funds between local
communities and organisations. But more ambitious uses are envisaged.
Regional planning is also seen as potentially establishing bases for
informing ATSIC policies, programs and budgetary decisions. A further
objective is to use them to integrate the planning capacities and
responsibilities of all government service providers and as the basis for
allocating all government resources within each region (ATSIC 1992b: 6,
1992c: 3, 6). It is not clear how all these objectives will be achieved in
practice.
Draft regional plans currently being produced by councils and their
consultants reveal a number of common priority areas for development,
such as health, employment, land, law and justice, housing and
infrastructure (ATSIC 1993b). These local funding priorities will
inevitably be reflected in regional budgetary bids. While regional plans
are undoubtedly beginning to inform ATSIC on broad issues and
priorities (ATSIC 1992b: 6), this currently occurs in an informal, ad hoc
manner reminiscent of DAA's previous approach to determining
allocations. It is not clear at the moment what weight funding priorities
and requests for additional funds from one council have relative to others.
There are no assessment mechanisms whereby the specific funding
priorities and issues raised in the plans are given equal consideration in
the financial decisions made at the board or State level. Neither is it clear
how different priorities across regions are going to be linked to the
broader allocation of all government resources without co-ordinating
arrangements and funding assessment mechanisms being set in place.
While the role of regional planning is held out as a substantial
development in indigenous financial self-determination, plans are not
currently an essential element integrated into the budget process.
Certainly, they provide no basis for the board, or SACs or regional
councillors and chairpersons, to determine allocations between regions. If
regional plans are to have wider budgeting and policy usefulness, this will
only begin to develop when intra-regional funding priorities are linked to
procedures for determining priority allocations between regions and
between broader program types. If regional plans are to be integrated
into overall financial planning and funding decisions, regional councils
will need to collate and update socioeconomic data highlighting their
needs and areas of relative disadvantage. Mechanisms will need to be
established for determining allocations between regions on the basis of
such data, and a national policy framework will be needed to guide
financial decisions.
Financial tensions at the regional council level
ATSIC's regional councils are in a difficult situation. The role of
councillors as financial mediators between ATSIC and local Aboriginal
communities and organisations is yet to be fully realised, as is their
political efficacy in competing for the financial attentions of other
government agencies (Dillon 1992: 102). At the same time, councils are
competing for funds and tensions are emerging as a result of the lack of
policy direction in funding decisions. Important questions are being raised
at the regional level about the manner and bases upon which program
funds are allocated between councils.
In their annual reports, a number of councils have pointed to the
particular difficulties, or disabilities, they face in regard to the costs of
providing services and have called for a greater share of funds. The
Wongi Regional Council (1991: 6) has argued that their region 'seems to
be disadvantaged compared with other regions', pointing to homelessness,
overcrowding in houses and related social problems. The Tasmanian
Aboriginal Regional Council (1991: 11) claims that it is financially
disadvantaged. The chairperson of the New South Wales Far West
Regional Council (1991: 3) has stressed the budgetary disabilities created
by the remoteness of the region, arguing that decisions made on the
strength of urban-based, coastal populations do not take into account the
higher costs the region faces. Obtaining additional ATSIC funds to offset
these disadvantages is high on these councils' priorities.
Some councils point to specific factors which they feel should be taken
into account in the inter-regional distribution of funds. In its inaugural
annual report, the Western Desert Regional Council (1991: 5; see also
Miwatj Regional Council 1992: 6) argued 'that consideration be given for
funding amounts for the size of the region's population, and numbers of
Aboriginal communities, and remoteness'. The Ngarda-Ngarli-Yarndu
Council (1991: 15) in the Pilbara region called for ATSIC funding
decisions to take population size and remoteness into account, and
expressed concern with the level of funds allocated to the region under
CHIP for the size of their communities, 'compared with other regional
councils'. In a similar vein, the Sydney Regional Council (1991: 47)
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complained that it fared badly under the allocation of monies via CHIP in
relation to the size of their communities, arguing that 'as we are only one
Regional Council out of 13 in this State, although having 30 per cent of
the New South Wales Aboriginal population, the formula to distribute
funds in this arbitrary manner virtually disenfranchises the largest
Aboriginal community in Australia ...'. The Kaatanyiny Regional Council
(1991: 10) in south-west Western Australia directly expressed its concern
over what it called 'funding equity' in ATSIC and other government
distribution of monies; and especially 'at the distribution of funds between
regions'. Similarly, the South-East Queensland Indigenous Regional
Council (1992: 3) recently argued that ATSIC's current 'funding formula
... greatly disadvantages the more densely populated regions'.
In fact ATSIC has no 'funding formula' and could be said to be in dire
need, if not of a formula, then of a more consistent, uniform approach to
assessing funding needs and determining the subsequent distribution
between regional councils. There is a growing recognition at the regional
level that differing social, demographic, economic and geographic
characteristics will create different needs and service provision costs
between councils. Calls for a more equitable distribution of ATSIC funds,
on the bases of identified socioeconomic needs and service provision
costs, will continue to be expressed.9 They are likely to grow more
vociferous and urgent in the face of regional competition for scarce
resources, and as councils attempt to establish their role and influence
with local Aboriginal organisations and communities.
ATSIC's current funding role: issues and implications
ATSIC is currently endeavouring to establish budgetary procedures based
on its representative organisation. At the same time it is locked into an
historically-based, complex program structure. Neither the existing
program structure, nor current distribution practice appear to be entirely
suited to the challenges facing the new organisation. A number of issues
and implications raised by the current absence of funding policy and
mechanisms are considered below.
The need for funding equity
ATSIC's coiporate plan presents its social and economic objectives in
greater detail, as well as strategies and policies for their pursuit over the
period 1992-96. The corporate plan provides strong direction to promote
funding equity in its activities. The commitment asserted in the plan is to
'rigourously set priorities' in resource allocations. It is here that we find
the improvement of indigenous social, economic and cultural status
directly linked to ATSIC's role in negotiating 'an equitable distribution of
financial and other resources to ensure the effective delivery of programs
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and services that meet the needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
communities' (ATSIC 1992b: 6, 9). While this particular role is directed
to ATSIC's relationships with Commonwealth, State and local
governments, the important objective of achieving an 'equitable
distribution' of resources obviously applies to its own budgetary process.
The approach ATSIC takes to allocating funds across program categories
and between States and regional councils could provide an important
means of furthering access and equity objectives; access, in terms of social
justice objectives of ensuring access to essential services such as housing,
health care and education, and equity, in the sense of achieving a 'fair
distribution of economic resources' (Commonwealth of Australia 1992:
21). In this regard, ATSIC has a key role to play in establishing funding
policies and mechanisms which meet national and regional indigenous
priorities. A crucial consideration is the need to devise an approach which
promotes equitable funding and access outcomes between regional
councils, many of which display significant differences in socioeconomic
status (Tesfaghiorghis 1991; Khalidi 1992; ATSIC 1992a: 60-3).
Financial tensions and variable levels of socioeconomic disadvantage
operating at the regional level will not be completely resolved by
establishing a more transparent, equitable method of distributing funds
between councils. There will always be a shortfall of available funds to
meet demands, and levels of indigenous disadvantage are high.
Nevertheless, such tensions will be considerably lessened by an approach
which takes relative levels of disadvantage into account. Areas of relative
inequality between councils could also be most effectively targeted by
funding mechanisms that emphasise long-term consistency in decision
making and which promote an equitable distribution of ATSIC's available
economic resources.
Allocative efficiency and ATSIC funding
The Commonwealth Treasury has argued, in respect of Commonwealth
redistribution of revenues to the States, that in order to maximise
allocative efficiency within the budget process and reduce costs, public
sector services should be curtailed where costs exceed their value to users
(see Northern Territory Government 1991: 72). Underlying this is the
argument that particular distributions of population or resources that
happen to exist between States, or locations within States, at any particular
time should not necessarily be preserved if they negatively affect the
efficiency of financial distribution.
The growing pressure for allocative efficiency in the Aboriginal affairs
policy environment needs to be situated within the cultural, historical and
economic particularities that have determined, and continue to determine,
the spread of the population and service provision costs. The distribution
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of the indigenous Australian populations has partly resulted from the
historical intervention of government. But cultural imperatives are also at
the bases of other population movements (such as the outstation
movement) and will, no doubt, continue to reinforce the distribution of
small groups in remote locations. It appears unlikely that Aboriginal
people will relocate in significant numbers in order to follow services and
employment (Taylor 1991).
ATSIC's funding policy and distribution should advocate allocative
realism; valid cultural choices, as well as historical intervention, underlie
the distribution of the indigenous population and these factors continue to
have considerable impact on financial planning, funding priorities and
service provision costs. Accordingly, the different social, demographic,
geographic and other cost-related characteristics of regional populations
are legitimate, indeed crucial factors for inclusion in ATSIC decisions
concerning resource distribution.
Regionalisation
There is considerable complexity in ATSIC's program and funding
environment. The present program structure is too detailed and
cumbersome, especially when compounded by the budgetary activities of
60 regional councils. It is also difficult to achieve an even and equitable
distribution of funds on the basis of the current structure. The cultural
heterogeneity of the Aboriginal population and variations in
socioeconomic status within and between regions have always produced
idiosyncratic versions of programs and services on the ground. The
regionalisation of program initiatives and needs currently being expressed
through the council structure will increasingly influence the functionally-
based program structure.
As Dillon (1992: 102) points out, a 'geographic approach1 to program
formulation has a number of advantages over 'functionally-based
programs' in an institution with such a strong regional basis. Indeed, the
very nature of its regional organisation and the growing assertiveness of
councils, makes a geographic regionalisation of the program structure
inevitable. Such a geographic framework also appears to be more
appropriate to its budget development process and to the 'clear intention'
of the ATSIC legislation to maximise the amount of funds available for
allocation by regional councils (ATSIC 1992a: 10). At the moment, an
historically-established set of detailed program components and sub-
components is being transferred onto a new and evolving regional
representative system. A geographic approach to program formulation
could usefully enable the overly complex functional program structure to
be simplified. As regional councils and the communities within them
progressively determine priorities in their service and funding needs, they
will begin to negotiate service packages (see Australian National Audit
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Office 1992: 18-9; Smith 1992: 24). As a consequence, the current
functional basis to ATSIC's program structure may need to be simplified
and program resources reoriented towards a narrower range of high
priority activities at the regional level. Eventually there will be equally
compelling reasons to monitor program outcomes at the regional level.
By implication, financial data collection and analysis will need to be
progressively directed to the regional level. Mechanisms will need to be
established for obtaining periodic information from regional councils on
their local funding economies, economic priorities, service requirements
and cost disabilities. Clearly, regional plans provide one such source of
information, though there would need to be certain areas of standardised
data available from all councils.
A program structure based on regional packages would greatly facilitate
the attainment of horizontal equity in the delivery of ATSIC's programs.
A geographic orientation to program formulation would also serve to
align the program structure and budget development process with the
strategic importance of the regional representative structure.
Decentralisation
Associated with the growing assertiveness of regional councils is the trend
towards organisational decentralisation. The dynamic cultural and
socioeconomic factors underlying service needs in Aboriginal affairs
require innovative and often non-standard work from ATSIC
administrative staff and elected representatives in both program and
policy implementation. Funding and program requirements at the
regional level are variable and often difficult to regulate by centralised
rules and procedures (see Australian National Audit Office 1992). ATSIC
will be subject to the same pressures for greater political and financial
autonomy at the regional level as has been noted in other contemporary
Aboriginal political institutions (Coombs 1984; Coombs et al. 1989;
Tonkinson and Howard 1990).
The pressure towards decentralisation within ATSIC is most evident at the
regional council level and especially with respect to financial
responsibilities and decisions. A meeting of ATSIC commissioners and
regional councillors also recommended that 'the Commission should
embrace fully the concepts of devolution and decentralisation' (ATSIC
1991: 90). This intention accords with a growing regional vision of
increased financial self-determination.
If it is to occur, financial decentralisation needs to be placed within an
integrated policy framework based on practical procedures that link
funding decisions made at the regional level with overall policy objectives
established by the board, and that link national decisions about funding
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distribution to regional priorities and relative needs. A more
geographically-based program structure and a system of resource
distribution based on regional equity should facilitate accountable
decentralisation.
A national funding policy
The absence of a holistic, integrated approach is apparent at all levels of
ATSIC's financial allocations. An evaluation of its administration of
states' grants by its Office of Evaluation and Audit (OEA) was unable to
identify a documented policy on the provision of grants to the States,
reporting that allocations were essentially ad hoc (OEA 199la). The OEA
recommended that ATSIC develop a comprehensive national policy on
state grants and their administration.
The lack of funding policy guidelines was also raised in the OEA (1991b)
evaluation of ATSIC's community infrastructure program. The OEA
(1991b: 75) reported that in some regional offices, funding decisions
were often directed towards communities experiencing crises and argued
that this occurred 'because guidelines and funding criteria do not exist'.
As a consequence, decisions to fund projects were essentially 'subjective
judgements by regional staff based on knowledge of local conditions'
(OEA 199Ib: 75). The audit warned that this ad hoc funding approach
creates a potential source of intra-regional community tension when each
community perceives its own needs as the highest priority and noted that
problems are exacerbated when applied across regions in the context of
competition for resources.
A key recommendation from the OEA report on infrastructure program
funding was that ATSIC 'establish a framework which enables the
identification and prioritisation of infrastructure needs on a national basis'
(OEA 1991b: 1, 75). The review also recommended that the organisation
and State governments should work to agreed priority schedules. Both of
the above OEA audits emphasised that priority schedules should be based
on data identifying areas of relative disadvantage between regions.
ATSIC's ability to co-ordinate such schedules and achieve distributional
equity are reliant upon the establishment of an effective national policy
instrument.
The lack of such a funding policy is especially evident in respect to the
distribution of financial resources between regional councils. As noted
above, ATSIC's corporate plan broadly directs it to set priorities between
regional needs and to ensure an equitable distribution of resources to meet
them. Competition for resources between regional councils will be
exacerbated by the lack of policy guidelines for inter-regional and
interstate funding distribution. More is required than procedural
guidelines for the mix of program funding. Not only does the level of
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disadvantage in each region need to be assessed, but also relative
disadvantage between regional councils, so that the total set of funding
priorities can be evaluated. For this to occur mechanisms are required for
making periodic comparative assessments of the socioeconomic status and
financial assistance requirements of councils. Such assessment and
distribution mechanisms need to be informed by policy which encourages
long-term consistency and transparency in financial decision-making and
which promotes a pattern of allocations that advance equitable outcomes.
Conclusion
The co-ordination of ATSIC's own financial activities and the
effectiveness of its regional structure cannot be examined in isolation
from that of other government agencies delivering, in some cases, similar
services. The need for rationalisation and co-ordination of State and
Commonwealth service delivery at the regional level is increasingly being
highlighted by regional councils (Arltarlpilta Regional Council 1992: 10;
Impiyara Regional Council 1992).
ATSIC has a statutory co-ordinating role with respect to the activities of
other Commonwealth bodies servicing indigenous Australians, and the
board has approved the establishment of a multilateral government
commitment to achieve improved outcomes in the delivery of programs
and services to indigenous people (ATSIC 1993a: 25). At a meeting in
December 1992 of the Council of Australian Governments, State and
Commonwealth governments formally accepted their responsibility to
maintain mainstream and special services. To be effective, such a
commitment should be backed up by a strategic approach to funding
distribution at the intergovernmental and interagency levels.
ATSIC (1993a: 26) has stated its intention to proceed with the negotiation
of bilateral agreements with State governments aimed at improving co-
ordination of services and at 'identifying funding arrangements'. These
agreements potentially provide ATSIC with the opportunity to extend its
own regional funding orientation and the policy platform of inter-
regional distributive equity, as the key basis for co-ordinating all
government service and program delivery to indigenous Australians. In
the longer term, ATSIC funding policy and practices that focus on service
needs identified in regional planning and that determine relative priorities
of regional council populations could usefully inform allocations at the
regional level by all agencies.
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Notes
1. ATSIC was established by the Australian Commonwealth Government under the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989, hereafter referred to as
the Act. When this term is used, it means the entire organisation as a statutory
authority.
2. Throughout this paper, the term 'Aboriginal' and 'indigenous' are used to refer to
both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.
3. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO 1992) has recently recommended a
series of changes to clarify and strengthen the evolving 'partnership' between
ATSIC's regional councils and administrative arm, and to increase the effective use
of resources in the face of expanding workloads at the regional level.
4. Under the current review being conducted into the ATSIC Act, it is likely that some
regional and zone boundaries will be redrawn, reducing the number of regional
council areas by amalgamating some existing council jurisdictions.
5. Subsequent to the federal election in 1993 the Labor Government established an
Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs within the Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Office will provide advice to the Minister and have
a policy advising capability to both the Minister and the Prime Minister (Keating
1993: 2). It is not clear how such policy advice will be co-ordinated with similar,
legally-designated functions undertaken by ATSIC.
6. Of these statutory exclusions, funds allocated to the CDEP scheme above of $234.6
million represented 46 per cent (ATSIC 1992a: 15).
7. These national program exclusions, initiated by Commission decision, comprise the
National Aboriginal Health Strategy, the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths
in Custody, Community Training Program, multi-regional projects, as well as a
number of other program areas to do with regional planning, heritage, arts and
crafts, language, community awareness, recreation, women's issues, broadcasting,
family support, and national program support costs (ATSIC 1992a: 17).
8. The Commonwealth Grants Commission (1993: 65) has also noted in its most
recent review of grant relativities that there are 'quite wide disparities' in the broader
aggregate allocations of ATSIC's funds between States and that they could not be
assured that ATSIC's interstate distributions sufficiently reflect needs-based criteria
compatible with the Grants Commission's principle of fiscal equalisation.
9. One can only assume that these calls will eventually be extended to include funding
and services provided by governmentdepartments apart from ATSIC.
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